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Revising the Consumer Acquis: (Half) Opening the Doors of the 
Trojan Horse 
JACOBIEN W. RUTGERS AND RUTH SEFTON-GREEN*
Abstract: This paper investigates the Green Paper’s proposals for the revision of the 
Consumer Acquis from the angle of public consultation. The Green Paper asks many 
abstract questions; however, the crucial question of whether Europe needs and/or wants 
a European Consumer Code has not been addressed. The rhetorical use of leading ques-
tions seems to lean in one direction, which is a horizontal instrument embracing maxi-
mum harmonization. The imperatives of the Green Paper are highly political and not 
merely technical, as the Commission seems to suggest. Only two policy-oriented goals are 
mentioned, yet others need to be identiﬁ ed and pursued, such as the appropriate level of 
consumer protection. First, this paper adopts a critical methodological enquiry to exam-
ine the Commission’s leading questions technique, as well as indicates that the presen-
tation of its report on the outcome of public consultation is not entirely neutral. Next, 
the option of a horizontal instrument is discussed more fully. It would seem that more 
empirical evidence is required to convince us of that such an instrument is workable and 
effective. Finally, the appropriate level of harmonization – minimum or maximum – is 
investigated. Arguments against ‘full targeted harmonization’ are given. It is suggested 
that the Commission is not telling us the full story.
Résumé: Les propositions du Papier Vert pour la révision de l’acquis communautaire 
seront examinées dans cet article sous l’angle de la consultation publique. Le Papier 
Vert pose beaucoup de questions abstraites, mais ne pose pas celle, cruciale, qui con-
siste à savoir si l’Europe a besoin et/ou souhaite un Code européen de la consommation. 
L’utilisation d’une technique de rhétorique semble conduire dans une seule direction, à 
savoir l’adoption d’un instrument horizontal englobant l’harmonisation maximale. Les 
impératifs du Papier Vert sont hautement politiques et pas simplement techniques, comme 
la Commission le laisse entendre. Seuls deux buts politiquement orientés sont mention-
nés, alors qu’il est nécessaire d’identiﬁ er et poursuivre d’autres, tel le degré approprié 
de protection des consommateurs. D’abord, une analyse critique et méthodologique sera 
entreprise pour examiner la technique de la Commission consistant à poser des ques-
tions directives. Nous constatons également que la présentation de l’issue de la consulta-
tion publique faite par la Commission dans son rapport est loin d’être neutre. Ensuite, 
l’option de l’instrument horizontal sera considérée plus en profondeur. Il semblerait qu’il 
faille apporter davantage de preuves empiriques aﬁ n de nous convaincre qu’un tel instru-
ment sera opérationnel et effectif. Enﬁ n, le degré approprié - minimal ou maximal - de 
protection des consommateurs sera étudié. Des arguments contre l’harmonisation ciblée 
et maximale seront discutés. Il nous semble que la Commission ne nous révèle pas toute 
l’histoire.
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Vorschläge im Grünbuch über die 
Überprüfung des gemeinschaftlichen Besitzstands im Verbraucherschutz aus Sicht einer 
öffentlichen Konsultation. Das Grünbuch wirft viele abstrakte Fragen auf. Dagegen wird 
* J.W. RUTGERS is Senior Lecturer at VU University, Amsterdam, and R. SEFTON-GREEN is Senior 
Lecturer at Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne).
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die entscheidende Frage, ob nämlich Europa ein Europäisches Verbrauchergesetzbuch 
überhaupt braucht, nicht gestellt. Die rhetorische Verwendung von Suggestivfragen 
scheint allerdings in eine Richtung hinzudeuten, nach der eine horizontale Maßnahme 
einzuführen ist, die eine maximale Harmonisierung umfasst. Die Aussagen im Grünbuch 
sind von höchst politischer und kaum von technischer Art, wie die Europäische Kom-
mission scheint anzunehmen. Lediglich zwei politisch orientierte Ziele werden genannt. 
Dagegen müssen andere Ziele noch herausgearbeitet und weiterentwickelt werden. 
Hierzu zählt zum Beispiel die Frage nach dem maßgeblichen Umfang des Verbrauch-
erschutzes. Zunächst soll in diesem Beitrag eine kritische methodologische Untersuchung 
erfolgen, in der die Technik der Fragestellung der Europäischen Kommission untersucht 
werden soll sowie auch aufgezeigt werden soll, dass die Präsentation ihres Berichts über 
die Ergebnisse der öffentlichen Anhörung nicht völlig neutral ist. Anschließend soll der 
Vorschlag zur Einführung einer horizontalen Maßnahme ausführlich untersucht werden. 
Dabei erscheint es, dass mehr empirische Beweise erforderlich sind, um uns überzeugen 
zu können, dass ein solches Instrument funktionsfähig und effektiv ist. Schließlich soll 
der maßgebliche Harmonisierungsumfang untersucht werden: minimale oder maximale 
Harmonisierung. Dabei sollen die Argumente gegen eine „umfassende Vollharmonisier-
ung“ gegeben werden. Zudem wird angenommen, dass die Europäische Kommission uns 
die volle Wahrheit nicht erzählt.
 1. Introduction
The European Commission first introduced the Common Frame of Reference (CFR) 
in its Action Plan of 2003.1 Subsequently, the CFR earned the nickname of a Trojan 
Horse.2 The CFR project has gotten well under way since then3 and a distinction can 
be made between an academic CFR and the actual or political CFR.4 Consultation 
via stakeholders is one of the key features of the CFR project. Within the CFR, con-
sultation of civil society takes place by means of workshops, which are organized by 
1 A More Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan, COM (2003), 68 final.
2 H. COLLINS, ‘The “Common Frame of Reference” for EC Contract Law: A Common Lawyer’s Per-
spective’, in L’Armonizzazione Del Diritto Privato Europeo, ed. M. MÉLI & M.R. MAUGERI (Giuf-
fre: 2004); The House of Lords Report on European Contract Law, April 2005, House of Lords, 
European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2004–05, European Contract Law: The Way 
Forward?, report with evidence, HL Paper 95, nos 62 et seq.
3 See B. LURGER, ‘The Common Frame of Reference/Optional Code and the Various Under-
standings of Social Justice in Europe’, in Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe, ed. T. 
 WILHELMSSON, E. PAUNIO & A. POHJOLAINEN (Kluwer, 2007), 177–199, for an illuminating 
enquiry of how the CFR could lead in turn to an optional instrument and the various implications 
of this development on social justice. In an attempt to avoid the rather gloomy scenarios posed by 
the optional instrument, the author suggests that the optional instrument should be proposed as a 
model for Member States and not for contracting parties.
4 See C. VON BAR et al., Draft Common Frame of Reference (Sellier, 2008), 3–4; Cf. Report from the 
Commission, Second Progress Report on the Common Frame of Reference (Brussels, 25 July 2007), 
COM (2007), 447 final, 12 (hereafter ‘Second Progress Report’). 
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the European Commission. The European Commission invites the stakeholders to 
these workshops.5 
On 8 February 2007, the Commission published a Green Paper on the Review 
of the Consumer Acquis, in which it asked the public a number of questions with 
respect to the revision of the Consumer Acquis.6 The European Commission placed 
this consultation within the context of its White Paper on Good Governance7 and 
its Communication ‘[t]owards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue − 
General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties 
by the Commission’.8 At the end of September 2007, a ‘Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Report on the Outcome of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on 
the Review of the Consumer Acquis’ (hereafter the ‘Outcome of Public Consultation 
Report’) was published on the website of Directorate General Consumer Policy, and 
in the beginning of November an analytical report by the Consumer Policy Evalu-
ation Consortium was published.9 The Commission’s whole initiative of asking for 
public consultation and reporting back on the replies is welcome.
However, when examining the Green Paper from the angle of public consul-
tation, several questions arise, such as: are the right questions being asked? Is the 
objective of public consultation one of transparency? Is transparency attained and 
with what degree of success? These questions and the Commission’s Outcome of 
Public Consultation Report form the wider backdrop of this paper. 
As an illustration of the Commission’s consultation methods, the Green Paper 
provides an interesting case study. Is the public capable of answering the kind of 
questions asked or do the latter use too many technical legal terms? Have all the rel-
evant issues been addressed? Why is the enquiry concentrated on just the Consumer 
Acquis and restricted to only eight directives in this area? How does this Green Paper 
fit with the CFR project and the draft CFR (DCFR)? The Green Paper only mentions 
5 See H. BEALE, ‘The European Commission’s Common Frame of Reference Project: A Progress 
Report’, European Review of Contract Law (ERCL) (2006): 303; ‘The Future of the Common Frame 
of Reference’, ERCL (2007): 257, 272–274. 
6 European Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, (Brussels, 8 February 
2007), COM (2006), 744 final (hereafter the ‘Green Paper’); see also C. PONCIBÒ, ‘The Challenges 
of EC Consumer Law’, EUI Working Papers (MWP, 2007), 24.
7 European Governance, A White Paper, (Brussels, 25 July 2001), COM (2001), 428 final.
8 Commission Staff Working Paper, Report on the Outcome of the Public Consultation on the Green 
Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, 2 (hereafter the ‘Outcome of Public Consultation 
Report’).
9 Analytical Report on the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis by Consumer Policy 
Evaluation Consortium, in Preparatory Work for the Impact Assessment on the Review of the Con-
sumer Acquis, DG Health and Consumer Protection, 6 November 2007 (hereafter the Analytical 
Report on the Green Paper), <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/detailed_analysis_en.pdf>.
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the CFR once,10 a point that has been criticized.11 The Second Progress Report on 
the CFR, published in July 2007, simply confirms that the link between these two 
projects is still unclear.12 At present, it looks as if the Commission has not yet made 
up its mind on how to link together the revision of the Consumer Acquis and the 
CFR projects, although it reiterates that it has no intention to produce a European 
Civil Code.13
In reality, the genuine issue of the Green Paper is whether Europe needs 
and/or wants a European Consumer Code that applies to both domestic and cross-
border transactions rather than just a revision of eight directives in the area of the 
Consumer Acquis.14 However, this question has not been raised and is disguised by 
all the other questions. Nevertheless, the Commissioner for Consumer Protection, 
Meglena Kuneva, said recently that one of the objectives of her consumer strategy 
was ‘to establish a single, simple set of rights and obligations Europe-wide’.15 Tak-
ing into account all this and the summary by the Commission of the responses to the 
Green Paper, the horizon is sufficiently hazy for us to speculate that the Commission 
may come up with a proposal to produce a European Consumer Code instead, which 
it calls a ‘horizontal instrument embracing maximum harmonization’, a so-called 
back-door approach.16
We will discuss a limited number of issues that are raised in the Green Paper 
from a critical standpoint. First, a few general remarks will be made about the type of 
questions and the methodological consequences of the approach taken in the Green 
Paper. Subsequently, the Commission’s Outcome of Public Consultation Report will 
be briefly examined. Finally, we will focus on two issues: the horizontal instrument 
and the level of harmonization. 
10 Green Paper, n. 6 above, 4.
11 Outcome of Public Consultation Report, n. 8 above, 12, where it is noted that ‘several stakeholders 
asked for clarification regarding the relationship between a future horizontal instrument and … the 
CFR’.
12 Second Progress Report, n. 4 above, 2 & 10–11.
13 Ibid., 11.
14 M.W. HESSELINK, ‘Naar een (Europees) wetboek van consumentenrecht?’, Nederlands Juristenblad 
(NJB) (2007): 850, 853; M.W. HESSELINK, ‘Een Europees Burgerlijk Wetboek door de voordeur’, 
NJB (2007): 39; V. HEUTGER, ‘Der Abschluss der Diagnosephase zum Europäischen Vertragsrecht – 
Das Grünbuch 2007’, European Review of Private Law (ERPL) (2007): 723–724.
15 M. KUNEVA, European Commissioner for Consumer Protection, ‘European Consumer Policy in 
the 21st Century’, speech given at the Challenges and Opportunities for the Transatlantic Agenda 
conference at Harvard University (Cambridge, 2 October 2007), <http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/588&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN>. 
16 Cf. M.TJ. BOUWES, ‘Harmonisatie van het burgerlijk recht door de achterdeur, Een Common 
Frame of Reference’, NJB (2005): 944–948; F. JENSMA, ‘Europees Wetboek via de achterdeur’, NRC 
Handelsblad, 4 October 2007.
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 2. The Technique of ‘Leading Questions’
The objectives of the Commission are set out in the first part of the Green Paper; 
however, the core is in the annexes, which contain a series of questions and a 
choice of options. Yet the burning issue — namely, does Europe need and/or want a 
 European Consumer Code? — has not been addressed. The Green Paper asks a num-
ber of abstract questions, many of which concentrate on form rather than content. 
Without examining the real content of the rules concerned, it is difficult to answer 
these questions.17 Indeed, it may be preferable to suggest and to evaluate alternative 
concrete rules and their relationship with other areas of (contract) law rather than 
focusing exclusively on the form of legislation. The need to openly reveal the policy 
objectives of contract-law legislation has already been highlighted in the Manifesto 
for Social Justice.18 These imperatives are highly political and not merely technical, 
as this Green Paper suggests.19 For example, the Commission identifies two policy-
oriented (regulatory) goals, which are promoting consumer confidence and lessen-
ing market barriers. However, these are not the only goals that need to be identified 
and pursued. The appropriate level of consumer protection is also a primary objec-
tive on which consensus needs to be obtained. Such consensus can never be achieved 
if no discussion takes place. 
Secondly, it is obvious that many questions are inter-related.20 In many 
instances, a question cannot be answered without taking into account another one. 
For instance, it is difficult to answer Question 1 concerning the issue as to whether 
there should be either just a revision of the individual directives, a horizontal 
approach or no revision, without taking into account Question 3, which concerns 
the degree of harmonization. 
The phrasing of the questions also suggests a leading-questions approach. 
For example, Question 1 asks what the best approach to the review of consumer 
legislation is. However, the following questions only seem to concern the horizontal 
approach. This is particularly obvious in Question 2, which steers in one direction: 
‘what should be the scope of a possible horizontal instrument?’.21 In other words, it 
seems that certain options, which are not in fact real options, are included for the 
sake of appearances. 
17 Cf. the response of H. BEALE & H. SCHULTE-NÖLKE, response submitted on behalf of the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis 
Group), Question A3, 3.
18 Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: 
A Manifesto’, European Law Journal (ELJ) (2004): 653–674.
19 Cf. D. KENNEDY, ‘The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues of Contract Law’, ERPL (2001): 
7–28. 
20 Cf. BEALE & SCHULTE-NÖLKE, n. 17 above, answer to Question A3, 3.
21 Green Paper, n. 6 above, 14.
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Moreover, the attempt to answer some of the questions only led to the need to 
address many more questions that were not asked. One of the crucial questions left 
unaddressed is whether the horizontal instrument should be either a directive or a 
regulation. This issue is also related to that of minimum harmonization, as will be 
discussed in section 5 below. 
In short, the Green Paper asks many questions, but not necessarily the right 
ones, in our view.22 The apparent exhaustiveness of the issues raised cleverly dis-
guises the fact that many crucial questions remain unasked. 
 3. The Commission’s Outcome of Public Consultation Report 
From the website of the European Commission, it follows that approximately thirty 
countries, Member States and non-Member States alike, responded to the questions 
of the European Commission, as well as approximately thirty academics or groups 
of academics, forty-one consumer organizations, five European Consumer Centres, 
188 businesses, and twenty other stakeholders.23 In its Executive Summary, the 
European Commission comes to the conclusion that ‘a majority of respondents call 
for the adoption of a horizontal legislative instrument applicable to domestic and 
cross-border transactions, based on full targeted harmonisation; i.e.[,] targeted to 
the issues raising substantial barriers to trade for business and/or deterring consum-
ers from buying cross -border’.24 However, the responses to the Green Paper can be 
distinguished in different ways. For instance, the Member States can be discerned 
from the consumer organizations, which in turn can be distinguished from the busi-
ness sector’s responses. Therefore, it seems too simplistic to state that a majority of 
the responses is in favour of full targeted harmonization. This also can be deduced 
from the Commission’s working document itself. The answers are elaborated upon 
in subsequent pages.25
22 Other academic replies published on the site tend to agree. See, for example, the replies submitted 
by H.W. MICKLITZ & N. REICH; S. WHITTAKER and Joint Response of the Society of Legal Schol-
ars and the Northern Commercial Law Group and the Consumer Academic Network (hereafter the 
‘Joint Response’), <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/index_en.htm>.
23 Cf. Analytical Report on the Green Paper, n. 9 above, 5. The numbers of responses in the different 
categories — business sector, consumer groups, public authorities, academics, legal practitioners, 
and others, listed in the Analytical Report — do not seem to correspond to those mentioned on the 
website of the European Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/responses_green_
paper_acquis_en.htm>.
24 Outcome of Public Consultation Report, n. 8 above, 3.
25 Ibid., 4. For instance, with respect to the question of whether minimum or maximum harmonization 
is desirable.
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 4. The Horizontal Instrument Option
A horizontal instrument is one of the options put forward in reply to the question as 
to which is the best way of reviewing consumer legislation.26 Horizontal harmoniza-
tion, in the context of reviewing the Consumer Acquis, is tantamount to a proposi-
tion to create a specific code of consumer law.27 This proposal cannot be approved 
or rejected without a fuller enquiry into the objectives, scope, and consequences of 
such an instrument. Yet the Commission presents the option as if it is disconnected 
to questions about the level of harmonization and the notion of consumer. This is 
misleading, to say the least.
 4.1 The Objectives behind a Horizontal Instrument
In its Green Paper, the Commission identifies explicitly promoting consumer con-
fidence and lessening market barriers.28 However, the explicit justification of these 
objectives does not preclude the existence of other implicit objectives. The objectives 
of a horizontal instrument require, first and foremost, an enquiry into the content of 
the rules contained therein. These are essentially political and sensitive issues.29 As 
indicated above, the appropriate level of consumer protection is a primary objective 
on which consensus needs to be obtained.30 This entails setting up a widespread con-
sultation process both for Member States and stakeholders, as the Green Paper and 
CFR have put into process,31 but it also requires consultation on the crucial issues. 
If a horizontal approach is adopted, it will be necessary to demonstrate empiri-
cally that it will be the most effective means of solving the perceived problems of frag-
mentation of rules, the existing regulatory gap, and so on, and more positively, an effec-
tive way of establishing consumer confidence32 and lessening barriers on the internal 
26 Option 2 of Question A1, European Commission, Green Paper, n. 6 above, 14, is in fact the only 
feasible option out of the three proposed by the Commission.
27 See MICKLITZ & REICH, ‘European Consumer Law-quo vadis?’, n. 22 above. The authors suggest 
that the revision of the acquis must be set in the context of the mandate given to the Commission 
in Tampere in 1999. However, they also suggest that the revision of the acquis represents a creative 
break on the part of the Commission (3). This has led them to raise a valuable criticism: Is the revi-
sion of eight directives sufficient to justify a total review of the acquis (4–6)? See 4.4 below. 
28 About these aims, see H. UNBERATH & A. JOHNSTON, ‘The Double-Headed Approach of the ECJ 
Concerning Consumer Protection’, Common Market Law Review (CML Rev.) (2007): 1237, 1242, 
1244 et seq.
29 M.W. HESSELINK, ‘The Politics of a European Civil Code’, ELJ (2004): 675, 684.
30 The transposition of Directive 1985 on product liability has already given rise to ECJ decisions on 
this very point. Case C-52/00 Commission v. France [2002] ECR I-3827; Case C-183/00 María 
Victoria González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA [2002] ECR I-3901.
31 See First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review, COM (2005), 
456 final; Green Paper, n. 6 above, 4; Second Annual Progress Report, n. 4 above.
32 See MICKLITZ & REICH, n. 22 above, 6, who highlight the Commission’s assumption that lack 
of consumer confidence is connected to minimum harmonization and the divergences that have 
resulted. Is it actually proven that divergence has a detrimental effect on consumer confidence in the 
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market. It is doubtful that such empirical evidence of its workability and effectiveness 
can be adduced. For example, if a framework instrument gives rise to varying interpre-
tations in different national legal systems, as for instance is the case at the moment with 
respect to good faith in the unfair terms directive,33 it will not be effective to achieve its 
aims. This would simply amount to a superficial clean-up operation.34 
 4.2 The Competence on Which a Horizontal Instrument Will Be Based 
If the option of a horizontal instrument covering both national and cross-border con-
tracts35 is implemented, then consideration must be given to the legal basis of this 
instrument. The Green Paper makes no mention of whether the horizontal instru-
ment is to be based on Article 95 or on Article 153 EC. The distinction between the 
two different competences is relevant, since Article 153(5) EC provides for minimum 
harmonization when measures are taken on the basis of Article 153(4) EC.36 How-
ever, when measures in the area of consumer policy are taken on the basis of Article 
95 EC, minimum harmonization is not required. Article 95(3) EC only demands a 
high level of consumer protection, which, moreover, does not include the highest 
level of consumer protection within the Union.37 
 4.3 The Form of a Horizontal Instrument
The question as to which kind of community instrument is to be used to achieve har-
monization has not been raised. In order to achieve the goals that the Commission 
has set itself, namely, to remove fragmented rules and to enhance consumer confi-
dence, it has been suggested that a horizontal instrument would be best contained in 
a regulation.38 However, the symbolic aspect of a regulation may be less appealing.39 
As the Commission presents minimum and maximum harmonization as options, the 
use of a regulation may be implicitly precluded, even though it has been suggested 
internal market? Is there a relationship of cause and effect? The reasons for consumers’ mistrust of 
carrying out cross-border transactions are no doubt much more complex and deep-rooted than this. 
Will a harmonized European consumer law actually solve the problem? See also T.  WILHELMSSON, 
‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC Consumer Law’, Journal of Con-
sumer Policy (JCP) (2004): 317. 
33 Case C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v. Ludger Hofstetter 
und Ulrike Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3404.
34 See WHITTAKER’s response, n. 22 above, which talks of a potential and regrettable ‘paper 
 harmonization’.
35 Option 1 of Question A2, Green Paper, n. 6 above, 14.
36 H.-W. MICKLITZ, N. REICH & S. WEATHERILL, ‘EU Treaty Revision and Consumer Protection’, 
JCP (2004): 367, 375 et seq.
37 Id.
38 See N. REICH, ‘A European Contract Law, or an EU Contract Law Regulation for Consumers?’, JCP 
(2005): 383–407.
39 See the observation contained in the Joint Response, n. 22 above, 3.
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that, in the case of harmonization by means of a regulation, minimum harmonization 
would be possible.40 However, it is hard to imagine how this would work in  practice. 
If, on the contrary, the horizontal instrument is contained in a directive, the 
Member States will have to transpose it into their national legal systems.41 It follows 
that the form of the horizontal instrument is connected to the scope of the harmoni-
zation. If the directive has minimum harmonization in mind, Member States would 
still be allowed to introduce more stringent rules, i.e., with a higher level of protec-
tion for consumers, than those contained in the horizontal instrument. If the direc-
tive aims at maximum harmonization, then some Member States will of course be 
deprived of using more stringent rules and may have to dismantle existing protec-
tion. If this were to occur, it is extremely difficult to imagine how this would help 
promote consumer confidence. On the contrary, this would make harmonized Euro-
pean consumer law distinctly less attractive.42 
 4.4 The Scope of a Horizontal Instrument
In order to determine the scope of the potential horizontal instrument, it is neces-
sary to identify its objectives clearly and honestly, which, in turn, is inevitably related 
to a debate about appropriate levels of protection. The scope of a horizontal instru-
ment raises numerous issues of a differing nature.
− Firstly, it could relate to the issue of whether it applies to purely national situ-
ations or also to cross-border situations.
− Secondly, the substantive scope of such a horizontal instrument needs to be 
addressed. Should it be restricted to the eight directives, which the Commis-
sion takes into account, or should it be broader than this? Several academic 
responses have criticized the Green Paper’s approach as too narrow.43
− Thirdly, the Green Paper constantly refers to ‘all consumer contracts’, but it is 
necessary to clarify whether this means just contracts of sale as between busi-
nesses and consumers or also other contracts, such as contracts of hire,  consumer 
40 REICH, n. 38 above, 404, who suggests that in the case of minimum harmonization by means of 
a regulation, the rule is directly applicable to internal situations. However, when a Member State 
wishes to introduce more stringent rules, there are two sets of rules that could be applied in prin-
ciple: the European regulation and the national rules. This raises the issue as to how consumers 
and other parties will be able to find out which rules apply — the regulation or the more stringent 
national rules. This does not seem to increase consumer confidence.
41 Cf. HESSELINK, n. 14 above, 852.
42 See WHITTAKER, n. 22 above, 2–4; LURGER, n. 3 above. For that the idea to become acceptable, 
European contract law in general must be perceived as an improvement; see Manifesto Social Justice 
Group, n. 18 above, 670.
43 See, for example, MICKLITZ & REICH, n. 22 above. See also HEUTGER, n. 14 above, 732.
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credit,44 insurance, and the like. Will this suffice to unify a field of contract law 
(consumer contracts), or will it just achieve greater  disintegration?
− Finally, the notion of ‘consumer’ and ‘professional’ requires elucidation. The 
ambit of consumer-law rules will depend, in part, on how professionals and 
consumers are defined. 
Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle the scope of the horizontal instrument 
and its effects. For instance, if the option suggesting the horizontal instrument that has 
a limited scope — applying to cross-border contracts only45 — is adopted, it is difficult 
to see how the potential horizontal instrument will lessen the alleged obstacles of frag-
mented rules and the regulatory gap that exist at present. Conversely, it has also been 
pointed out that even if the proposed instrument covers domestic and cross-border con-
tracts, its impact is uncertain and will require adjustments from all actors involved.46 
Furthermore, the scope of a possible horizontal instrument may also have 
knock-on effects on the coherence of the legal discourse of private-law rules. While 
some may not consider that this consideration is paramount, it may also increase 
practical (as well as conceptual) difficulties. If an instrument covers cross-border 
contracts only, the bifurcation between national private-law rules and the instru-
ment may be even greater than at present. In other words, domestic contracts will be 
guided by a private-law reasoning based on corrective and commutative justice with 
regulatory concerns that have infiltrated this legal discourse, whereas the instru-
ment for cross-border contracts will be more regulatory in flavour.47 It is difficult 
to predict whether this will matter in practice and, more specifically, whether it will 
lead to greater disintegration.48 However, this possible risk should not be ignored, 
particularly as the Green Paper states that the purpose of the instrument is to coun-
teract the phenomenon of disintegration in the single market. 
 4.5 The Impact of a Horizontal Instrument
The question of whether the instrument would actually lessen barriers and achieve 
greater consumer confidence depends on the content of the rules. These goals will 
44 The lack of regulation of usurious levels of interest in consumer credit contracts is an area that 
could, and some would say should, fall within the scope of such an instrument. See P. ROTT, ‘Con-
sumer Guarantees in the Future Consumer Credit Directive: Mandatory Ban on Consumer Protec-
tion?’ ERPL (2005): 383; U. REIFNER, ‘Renting a Slave – European Contract Law in the Credit 
Society’, in Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe, ed. T. WILHELMSSON, E. PAUNIO & 
A.  POHJOLAINEN, n. 3 above, 309–326. 
45 Option 2 of Question A2, Green Paper, n. 6 above, 14.
46 See s. 4 point (5) below.
47 H. COLLINS, ‘The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European Legisla-
tion: In Search of the Philosopher’s Stone’, ERCL (2006): 213–226.
48 C. JOERGES, ‘The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New 
Legal Discipline’, EUI Working Paper LAW, no. 12 (2004).
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not be attained by the mere existence of the instrument that only applies to cross-
border contracts for several reasons:
(a) Attractiveness: It cannot be assumed that an instrument will necessarily be more 
attractive to both sets of interested parties. Cross-border contracts may become 
less attractive to consumers, or less attractive to businesses. This will depend on 
the level of protection provided in the instrument.
(b) Increase or decrease in consumer confidence?: The likelihood of harmonization 
leading to an increase in consumer confidence is tantamount to it having the 
opposite effect. For instance, it is equally plausible to suggest that harmoniza-
tion of cross-border contracts will decrease consumer confidence since, instinc-
tively, consumers will prefer to use national law because they are acquainted 
with it. This option would then be counter-productive to the Green Paper’s 
stated aims.
(c) Enforcing consumer law: The points above also depend on the facilities available 
to enforce both national law and the community instrument.49 It is highly sig-
nificant that ‘many respondents ask for more Alternative Dispute Mechanisms 
and easier access for consumers to ADRs and courts’.50 These issues need to be 
discussed and the potential conflicts of interest, as between consumers and busi-
nesses, need to be examined more fully. 
These ramifications tend to suggest that in order to be effective the horizontal 
instrument must, at the least, cover both domestic and cross-border contracts. 
Even then, many issues need to be explored further, and empirical evidence is 
required to ascertain both the impact and the effectiveness of this instrument. At 
present, it is difficult to predict that the horizontal instrument will achieve its end-
goal of making consumer law simpler, more accessible, and more certain through-
out the EU.51
 5. Levels of Harmonization: Minimum or Maximum Harmonization?
In Question 3, the European Commission raises the issue of relating to the level of 
harmonization. The two alternatives presented by the European Commission are:
Option 1: The revised legislation would be based on full harmonisation com-
plemented on issues not fully harmonised with a mutual recognition clause. 
49 See P. ROTT, ‘Effective Enforcement and Different Enforcement Cultures’, in Private Law and the 
Many Cultures of Europe, ed. T. WILHELMSSON, E. PAUNIO & A. POHJOLAINEN, n. 3 above, 
291–307.
50 See Outcome of Public Consultation Report, n. 8 above, 15–16.
51 LURGER, n. 3 above, 182–184. See Joint Response, n. 22 above, 4, which asks the Commission to 
assess the impact of this consequence in a follow-up to the Green Paper. 
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Option 2: The revised legislation would be based on minimum harmonisa-
tion combined with a mutual recognition clause or with the country of origin 
principle.52
In its Outcome of Public Consultation Report, the European Commission comes to 
the conclusion that the majority of respondents is in favour of ‘the adoption of a hor-
izontal legislative instrument applicable to domestic and cross-border transactions, 
based on full targeted harmonisation’.53 The Commission states further that the 
overall majority is in favour of full targeted harmonization.54 It is worth noting that 
the Commission only uses the expression ‘full harmonization’, rather than ‘full 
 targeted harmonization’, in the Green Paper.55 In its view, ‘full targeted harmoni-
zation’ means ‘targeted to the issues raising substantial barriers to trade for busi-
ness and/or deterring consumers from buying cross-border’.56 There is a noticeable 
shift in  language from ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ harmonization to ‘full targeted’ 
 harmonization. This indicates a shift of emphasis.
However, when the responses with respect to the question of full harmoniza-
tion are studied in more detail, the situation is less homogenous than the Commis-
sion indicates. For instance, 80% of businesses support maximum harmonization 
(even though they do not want a European Consumer Code),57 whereas a majority 
of the consumer organizations supports minimum harmonization. In this respect it 
is striking that the Commission does not provide a percentage for this second major-
ity. We do not know if it is quantitatively comparable to the first figure given, or a 
bare majority, for example. Four Member States are in favour of minimum harmo-
nization. However, the Commission does not specify which Member States. It would 
be interesting to know whether they are the Scandinavian Member States, since they 
have a high level of consumer protection and may be afraid that they will have to put 
up with a lower level of consumer protection.
The position of the European Parliament is perhaps somewhat contradic-
tory in an attempt to achieve a compromise. First, it suggests that the horizontal 
instrument should start from the principle of full targeted harmonization, but sub-
sequently, it states, according to the Commission, that the directives under review 
should be based on minimum harmonization. Overall, this is not very helpful.
Moreover, consumer organizations also link the issue of minimum or maxi-
mum harmonization to the content of the rules. When the rules provide a high 
level of consumer protection, they are not against them as such. Indeed, we agree 
52 Green Paper, n. 6 above, 15.
53 Outcome of Public Consultation Report, n. 8 above, 4.
54 Ibid.
55 See, for instance, Green Paper Question 3, n. 6 above, 14–15.
56 Outcome of Public Consultation Report, n. 8 above, 4.
57 Ibid.
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that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the potential benefits or drawbacks of full 
harmonization in the abstract, as we need to examine the precise content of cer-
tain rules to determine what the optimum solution is and to whom it applies. In 
addition, full harmonization will have significant snowball effects on national pri-
vate law’s classifications and systems, a point that needs to be taken into consider-
ation.58 The level of harmonization is a primary objective that should be discussed 
before considering the related questions of form and scope, as the Commission 
has done.59 
Full harmonization will, on the face of it, achieve the Green Paper’s aims of 
reducing national diversity, thereby increasing consumer confidence and reducing 
obstacles to trade. However, this statement cannot be taken at face value because it 
only considers the picture from a biased focal point. The Green Paper’s ‘rhetoric’ 
certainly steers in this direction as the following extract illustrates:
The overarching aim of the Review is to achieve a real consumer internal mar-
ket striking a balance between a high level of consumer protection and the 
competitiveness of enterprises, while ensuring the strict respect of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity. At the end of the exercise it should, ideally, be possible 
to say to EU consumers ‘wherever you are in the EU or wherever you buy from 
it makes no difference: your essential rights are the same’.60
The real question, of course, is how to achieve a ‘high level of protection’ across the 
EU. This exercise is not a neutral technical legal one at all; it is axiological. In other 
words, what might be called a high level of protection might not be high enough 
according to some and too high according to others. The level of consumer pro-
tection is both a relative and variable concept depending on the standpoint of the 
 assessor. We perceive this as a question of legal policy, as well as entailing a division 
of labour between the Member States and the EU.61
In parentheses, the other related question of paramount importance in rela-
tion to maximum harmonization is that of the Community’s competence, or room for 
manoeuvre, in this area. The Green Paper refers to this issue neatly by reminding us 
of the ‘need to respect the principle of subsidiarity’. This second ‘norm- descriptive’, 
58 As stated above. See also T. WILHELMSSON, ‘Theses on the Task of the Member States’, in 
 Verbraucherrecht in Deutschland – Stand und Perspektiven, ed. H.-W. MICKLITZ (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2005), 37–63, 56–59.
59 Green Paper Questions A1 and A2 respectively, n. 6 above, 14.
60 Green Paper, n. 6 above, 3.
61 WILHELMSSON, n. 58 above, 44. 
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or ‘norm-analytical’, approach is not the focus of our concern and has already been 
the object of significant academic discussion and enquiry.62 
As far as the legal-policy approach is concerned, scholars have already pointed 
out the need to discuss the Commission’s change of direction from minimum to max-
imum harmonization.63 Once again, the Green Paper does not explicitly state that 
the Commission is in favour of maximum harmonization, but one does not even have 
to read between the lines to understand that this is the case. This is a continuous 
evolution, in line with the horizontal Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which 
has adopted maximum harmonization.64 To summarize, we could say that full har-
monization is à la mode. However, even if fashions permeate our consciousness, it 
may be risky to adopt them uncritically.
Numerous criticisms can be made of this maximalist trend on various grounds; 
we shall focus on five non-exhaustive arguments:
(1)  It has already been shown that the internal-market justificatory arguments, 
advanced by the Commission in order to promote the maximalist position, are 
far from compelling.65 These include preferring equal conditions of competition, 
activating the role of the internal-market consumer, and removing obstacles to 
cross-border activities. Little empirical evidence exists to support the arguments 
advanced, to both consumer confidence and, in particular, to reducing the trans-
action costs involved in existing legal diversity.
(2)  More particularly, a convincing demonstration has already been made to show 
that the main argument in favour of full harmonization in order to promote 
consumer confidence, the focus of the Green Paper, is particularly weak.66 
An important distinction must be made as to the substantive and procedural 
 confidence of consumers. In other words, consumers may not be eager to buy 
across borders for practical reasons linked to access to justice and enforcement, 
more than due to fear of an unknown law. In short, pluralist strands of consumer 
confidence and consumer expectations can be identified throughout the EU. 
These are sometimes epitomized as diverse consumer cultures.67
62 See further on this question, for example, S. WEATHERILL, ‘Maximum or Minimum Harmoniza-
tion: What Kind of “Europe” Do We Want?’, in The Future of European Contract Law, ed. K. Bode-
Woelki & W. Grosheide (Kluwer, 2007), 133-146. 
63 T. WILHELMSSON, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC Consumer 
Law’, JCP (2004): 317, 322.
64 Cf. UBERATH & JOHNSTON, n. 28 above, 1254; WILHELMSSON, n. 63 above, 317 & 322.
65 See, for example, WILHELMSSON, n. 58 above, 45–51; Manifesto Social Justice Group, n. 18 above, 
661.
66 MICKLITZ & REICH, n. 22 above.
67 T. WILHELMSSON, ‘The Average European Consumer: A Legal Fiction’, in Private Law and the 
Many Cultures of Europe, ed. T. WILHELMSSON, E. PAUNIO & A. POHJOLAINEN, n. 3 above, 
243–268, with examples of European variations on 259–264.
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(3)  Difficult legal questions will arise as a result of maximum harmonization. An 
example of this kind of difficulty, which we have called the ‘coherence of the 
legal discourse of private law’, has been considered above. This kind of argument, 
which may appear to be rather ‘systematic-oriented’, must not be played down. 
Details matter particularly in contract law, which is such a significant vehicle of 
our social and moral values68 as well as an instrument for economic steering69 
– not least because contract law has to adjudicate conflicting private interests 
and decide in each particular case to whom priority should be given. A certain 
degree of flexibility and casuistry must be maintained to achieve this goal. Maxi-
mum harmonization may not be the best way of achieving such flexibility. Exam-
ples of the negative effects of maximum harmonization of the product liability 
and unfair contract terms directive have already been discussed.70 Maximizing 
these directives could lead to lowering standards of protection in some Member 
States and engendering a sort of discrimination between consumers and com-
mercial parties, both of which would be counter-productive to the stated aims of 
the Green Paper, since these consequences would neither overcome fragmentary 
legislation or the regulatory gap, nor promote consumer confidence. The net 
effect might well be a new form of further disintegration, which the Commission 
clearly wants to avoid. Likewise, the proposal to add in an overarching good-faith 
clause, in addition to maximum harmonization, looks like an attempt to clutch at 
straws as a last resort.71 If such a clause were to be included, would it not just cre-
ate a new form of irritation,72 or of disintegration, that the Commission seems to 
find so upsetting to the good functioning of the internal market?
(4)  A penultimate argument relates to the desire to improve the quality of European 
legislation, an explicit goal of the Commission that has been expressed for some 
time.73 Our present experience so far has been that the EU has created a  dialogue 
and an exchange between the Community institutions and Member States, from 
68 R. SEFTON-GREEN, ‘Cultural Diversity and the Idea of a European Civil Code’, in The Politics 
of a European Civil Code, ed. M.W. HESSELINK, (Kluwer Law International, 2006), 71–88; 
R.  SEFTON-GREEN, ‘Social Justice and European Identity in European Contract Law’, ERCL 
(2006): 275–286. 
69 H. COLLINS, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999); Manifesto Social Justice Group, 
n. 18 above, 661.
70 WILHELMSSON, n. 58 above, 56–59.
71 Green Paper, n. 6 above, 17–18.
72 G. TEUBNER, ‘Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Ends Up in New Divergences’, Modern 
Law Review (ML Rev.) (1998): 11–31.
73 Communication from the Commission, ‘Action Plan Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory Envi-
ronment’, (Brussels, 5 June 2002), COM (2002), 278 final; Communication from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the 
Committee of the Regions, Updating and Simplifying the Community Acquis (Brussels, 11 February 
2003), COM (2003), 71 final.
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the national legislators and/or the judiciary. It has been argued elsewhere that 
this circulation of legal ideas and concepts helps us progress.74 The national 
forms of resistance75 are not necessarily negative; they have also helped created 
a dialogue between the various norm-makers. This is part of a process of legal 
and democratic experimentation, specific to the multi-level governance of the 
EU, which is part of its rich diversity.76 The bottom-line argument against maxi-
mum harmonization is very simple: There is no going backwards; no room for 
improvement, and no supplementation of European legislation by national leg-
islators will be possible any longer. This does not mean there is no going back 
altogether. It simply means we will have to end up relying on the judiciary to 
perform this task instead of national legislators. We are not going to make value 
judgements about this possibility, but simply wish to state the obvious, namely, 
that our faith in the judiciary is conditioned according to the legal culture to 
which we belong.
(5)  Finally, if full harmonization means lessening the present national levels of con-
sumer protection for certain Member States, and/or creating additional diver-
sity to the available remedies between consumer and commercial parties, its net 
effect will be the opposite of increasing consumer confidence in those Member 
States. In short, and once again, raising or lowering levels of harmonization 
is a political and legal policy question that cannot be disguised via a technical 
 exercise. 
In conclusion, one may wonder why the doors of the Trojan horse have only been 
half opened.
74 T. WILHELMSSON, ‘Private Law in the EU, Harmonized or Fragmented Europeanization?’, ERPL 
(2002): 77–94. 
75 D. CARUSO, ‘The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal 
Integration’, ELJ (1997): 3–32.
76 Manifesto Social Justice Group, n. 18 above, 668 et seq.
